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Abstract
This paper investigates the provision of insurance to workers against search-
induced wage uctuations. I rely on numerical simulations of a model of on-the-job
search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low skilled workers
in the U.S.. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of
a non-linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade-o¤ is that a more generous
provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better paying jobs, which is
detrimental to the production e¢ ciency of the economy. I show that progressivity
raises the search intensity of unemployed worker, which reduces the equilibrium rate
of unemployment, but lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which
results in a lower output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non-linear
transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide almost no insurance up to a
monthly income level of $1450, such as to preserve incentives to move up the wage
ladder, and full insurance above $1650. This policy halves the standard deviation
of labor incomes, increases output by 2.4% and generates a consumption-equivalent
welfare gain of 1.3%. Forbidding private savings does not fundamentally change the
shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more
insurance at the expense of production e¢ ciency.
Keywords: Moral hazard on the job, Optimal social insurance, Progressivity,
Search frictions
JEL Classication: H21, J38, J68
1 Introduction
The continuous reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs is an important
source of production e¢ ciency. However, at the individual level, this process generates
Contact: Jean-Baptiste.Michau@polytechnique.edu
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a substantial amount of wage uctuation. This raises the following questions: Should
workers be provided with insurance against these uctuations? If so, how?
The crux of the problem is that, under a generous provision of insurance, a low wage
worker has little incentives to move to a higher productivity job. Insurance against
wage uctuations therefore creates a moral hazard problem which is detrimental to the
production e¢ ciency of the economy.
The main contribution of this paper is to characterize the optimal provision of insur-
ance against search-induced wage dispersion. The approach that I follow could be seen
as a straightforward extension of the classical unemployment insurance problem. Indeed,
the goal is to reduce uctuations in labor income while the main impediment to the pro-
vision of insurance is a moral hazard e¤ect which reduces the intensity of job search. The
novelty is that, in my context, job search also occurs on the job.
My analysis of insurance against wage uctuations relies on a model of on-the-job
search. Both employed and unemployed workers choose a search intensity which deter-
mines the arrival rate of job o¤ers. The corresponding wage rates are randomly drawn
from an exogenous distribution. An employed worker only accepts an o¤er if it increases
his wage rate. Hence, on-the-job search enhances the production e¢ ciency of the economy
by inducing workers to move up a "wage ladder". Any match can be hit by an exogenous
job destruction shock which induces its worker to become unemployed. Individuals can
accumulate some precautionary savings to self-insurance against unemployment as well
as low wages realizations.
The insurance policy consists of a non-linear transfer schedule which determines the
labor income of a worker at each rung of the wage ladder. A budget constraint imposes
that the transfers must sum to zero. As it is not possible to characterize the optimal
policy analytically, I rely on numerical simulations throughout the paper. The model is
calibrated with PSID data to the U.S. economy. Importantly, insurance, unlike redistrib-
ution, can be conditioned on the education level of its beneciaries without discouraging
the accumulation of human capital. I therefore exclusively focus on the provision of
insurance to low skilled workers, who have never been to college.
In my analysis, I analyze the provision of insurance from both positive and normative
perspectives. From a positive perspective, I show that insurance against wage uctuations
increases the search intensity of unemployed workers which reduces the equilibrium rate of
unemployment. This is due to the combination of two factors. First, as the distribution of
actual wages rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of o¤ered wages, under
a balanced budget, the insurance raises the average level of o¤ered wages. Second, a
reduction in the dispersion of o¤ered wages enhances the attractiveness of being employed.
However, the provision of insurance through the implementation of a progressive transfer
schedule reduces the intensity of on-the-job search. This latter e¤ect dominates which
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explains why progressivity reduces the output level of the economy.
From a normative perspective, my main contribution is to characterize numerically
the optimal non-linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy consists in providing almost
no insurance to the lower half of the wage distribution, below $1450 per month, and full
insurance above $1650. This is a consequence of the fact that, in the absence of insurance,
on-the-job search is strong among low wage workers and very weak among high wage
workers who are unlikely to nd better paying jobs. Thus, the moral hazard problem of
insurance is concentrated towards the bottom of the wage distribution and it is absent
from the top. The elimination of labor income dispersion among workers earning more
than $1650 increases the search intensity of the unemployed and of low wage workers.
Thus, not only does the optimal insurance policy reduce uctuations in labor incomes,
it also enhances production e¢ ciency which raises output by 2.4%. The implementation
of this policy generates a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of about 1.3%. Finally,
the absence of private savings does not fundamentally alter these results, but tilts the
optimal policy towards more insurance at the expense of production e¢ ciency.
Related Literature. My paper is related to a substantial literature in public nance
which investigates the provision of insurance against income uctuations. However, none
of these papers, except for one important exception (Golosov, Maziero and Menzio 2012),
allow for search frictions as a source of income uncertainty.1 This is rather paradoxical
given the central importance of search frictions within the empirical literature on wage
uctuations. I now briey review these di¤erent strands of the literature.
Varian (1980) argued that the income of a worker is not only determined by ability at
birth but also, to an even greater extent, by luck. Based on this observation, he empha-
sized that a progressive income tax de facto provides insurance against uctuations in
labor income. He then characterized the optimal social insurance policy in a stylized two
period model. Eaton and Rosen (1980), Diamond, Helms and Mirrlees (1980) and Mir-
rlees (1990) made similar contributions, all focusing on linear tax schedules in uncertain
environments where the provision of insurance reduces labor supply.
Following the key contribution of Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003), a size-
able literature has emerged on the optimal design of insurance against hidden shocks to
productivity.2 In that framework, the labor market is competitive and the main imped-
iment to the provision of insurance is a large set of incentive compatibility constraints
which ensure that workers do not claim to be less productive than they truly are. Given
the complexity of the problem, the optimal policy could only be fully characterized in
1Hungerbühler, Lehmann, Parmentier and van der Linden (2006) and Schaal and Taschereau-
Dumouchel (2010) characterized the optimal redistribution policy in search models of the labor market.
However, these papers focus on redistribution across workers of di¤erent productivities, not on insurance
against wage uctuations.
2Kocherlakota (2010) o¤ers an extensive survey of this New Dynamic Public Finance literature.
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special cases. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) solved the optimal social insurance problem
when productivity shocks, and hence wages, are independently and identically distrib-
uted. More recently, Farhi and Werning (2013) managed to solve the AR(1) case.
My paper adopts a complementary perspective on the provision of insurance against
wage uctuations. Indeed, this literature focuses on the extent to which insurance against
exogenous changes in the wage rate a¤ects labor supply along the intensive margin. By
contrast, I assume that changes in the wage rate are caused by search frictions and I focus
on the extent to which insurance discourages workers from moving to higher productivity
jobs.3
As an alternative to solving complex mechanism design problems, a number of au-
thors have chosen to rely on stochastic macroeconomic models with heterogeneous agents
in order to investigate numerically the optimal design of social insurance. Importantly,
in these papers, the shape of the labor income tax simultaneously a¤ects both redistri-
bution and social insurance. More specically, Floden and Lindé (2001) restricted their
attention to linear taxes on labor income used to nance lump sum transfers. They found
that, in the U.S., raising the tax rate from 36.1% to the optimal level of 46% generates
a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 1.8%. Moving one step further, Conesa and
Krueger (2006) determined the optimal non-linear taxation of labor income within a ex-
ible three-parameter family of tax functions. They found that the optimal policy in the
U.S., which yields a welfare gain of 1.7%, is well approximated by a at tax rate of 17.2%
together with a deduction of $9400 (per annum). Karabarbounis (2012) investigated the
extent to which optimal non-linear labor income taxes should be di¤erentiated across
both age and wealth groups. He found that tax rates should be decreased for workers
who are older than 50, especially if they are wealthy, such as to induce them to have long
careers. Implementing the optimal policy generates a welfare gain of 0.85%.
These numerical papers simultaneously investigate the impact of progressive income
taxation on both redistribution and social insurance. However, as mentioned above,
social insurance, unlike redistribution, can be conditioned on the education level of its
beneciaries as the provision of insurance does not reduce incentives to invest in human
capital. Hence, in this paper, I abstract from redistribution across ex-ante heterogenous
workers and focus exclusively on the provision of insurance to low skilled workers.4
While none of the aforementioned papers allow for search frictions, Golosov, Maziero
and Menzio (2012) characterized analytically the optimal provision of insurance in a
directed search model of the labor market with homogenous workers and heterogeneous
rms. They found that the optimal policy consists in implementing an increasing and
3Another di¤erence is that, while the New Dynamic Public Finance literature manages to characterize
second-best policies, I restrict my attention to simple history-independent policies.
4My analysis abstracts from productivity di¤erences across low skilled workers due to unobserved
heterogeneity.
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regressive labor income tax which increases the fraction of unemployed workers who direct
their search towards high productivity jobs. Importantly, the directed nature of search
implies that, ex-ante, all workers always get the same utility, i.e. a worker only gets a
high wage if he is willing to face a long queue. Hence, the optimal regressive income tax
is a Pigovian tax that corrects for externalities.
My paper follows an alternative and complementary approach to search frictions. I
assume random search on and o¤ the job, instead of directed search o¤ the job. Hence,
wage dispersion is due to luck on the labor market. The provision of insurance is justied,
not to redirect the search e¤ort of unemployed workers from low to high productivity jobs,
but to attenuate the e¤ect of luck on wage dispersion. However, as we shall see, I also
nd that some regressivity is desirable in order to enhance workersincentives to search
for high productivity jobs.5
The labor market impact of income tax progressivity has also been analyzed by Pis-
sarides (1983) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) who, however, did not focus on the
provision of insurance against wage dispersion. Both emphasized that the implementa-
tion of progressive labor income taxes can reduce the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
While I obtain the same result, the underlying mechanism is somewhat di¤erent. They
argued that progressivity reduces the reservation wage below which a worker refuses an
o¤er or decides to quit his job. By contrast, in my model which allows for on-the-job
search, workers always prefer to be employed rather than unemployed. They therefore
accept all o¤ers. Instead, progressivity reduces unemployment by raising the search in-
tensity of unemployed workers. Interestingly, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) also found
that the reduction in unemployment due to progressivity comes at the cost of a decline
in the production e¢ ciency of the economy.
As mentioned above, my paper could be seen as a straightforward extension of the
classical unemployment insurance problem where the moral-hazard problem extends to
on-the-job search. Thus, Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Lentz (2009), which both
solved numerically for the optimal level of unemployment benets in the presence of
private savings, are two closely related contributions.
Finally, a number of papers of the macro-labor literature have recently emphasized
the importance of search frictions to account for the dynamics of wage uctuations. Low,
Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) performed an empirical decomposition of wage uctuations
into permanent individual-specic productivity shocks and match-specic shocks. They
found that the standard deviation of the match-specic shocks is more than twice as
large as that of the permanent shocks. The match-specic shocks are nevertheless less
5In my paper, regressivity induces low wage workers to search more intensively for high productivity
jobs; while, in Golosov, Maziero and Menzio (2012), regressivity induces a larger fraction of unemployed
workers to direct their search towards high productivity jobs.
5
persistent over the life-cycle. Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2013) found that job mobility
and unemployment account for 43.0% of the variance in lifetime earnings and 53.2% of
the variance in wages, while education account for about 30% of the variance in both
lifetime earnings and wages. These two empirical studies conrm that job mobility is a
major source of wage changes.
Lise (2013) argued that the dynamics of the wage ladder are a primary determinant of
the precautionary savings behavior of individuals. Relying on simulations of a structurally
estimated model of the wage ladder, he showed that the model generates distributions of
earnings, wealth and consumption which almost perfectly match their empirical counter-
parts. Lentz and Mortensen (2010) concluded from their survey of the literature that rm
heterogeneity, rather than worker heterogeneity, is the main explanation of productivity
di¤erences across workers and that the reallocation of workers from low to high wage
employers is a major source of productivity gains. Gentry and Hubbard (2004) estimated
that, in the U.S., a ve percentage point decrease in the marginal tax rate raises turnover
by 8%. This conrms the importance of moral hazard on the job. Finally, Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2013) recently provided some empirical evidence that wages are primarily
determined by match quality. This provides additional support for my model of the wage
ladder which does not allow for strategic bargaining or counter-o¤ers between a worker
and his employer.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model on which
I rely throughout my analysis. Section 3 is devoted to the calibration of the model.
In Section 4, I describe a benchmark simulation of the model. The policy analysis is
performed in Section 5. Section 6 investigates the policy consequences of not allowing for
private savings. The paper ends with a conclusion.
2 Model
Time is discrete and the horizon is innite. In each time period, a worker can either
be employed or unemployed. Workers are risk averse and derive an instantaneous utility
v(c) from consuming c in a given period, where v0() > 0 and v00() < 0. They discount
the future at rate .
In each period, an unemployed worker gets income b and needs to incur a cost Du(su)
in order to receive a job o¤er with probability su, where D0u() > 0 and D00u() > 0. If he
receives an o¤er, the corresponding wage rate w is randomly drawn from an exogenous
wage o¤er distribution with c.d.f. F (w), p.d.f. f(w) and support [w; w]. An unem-
ployed worker only chooses to accept an o¤er if the corresponding wage rate w is above
a threshold R, which occurs with probability 1  F (R).
The dispersion among o¤ered wages induces employed workers to continue searching
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on the job in the hope of obtaining a more lucrative position. Thus, in each period, a
worker employed at wage w receives his income w and incurs a cost D(s) in order to
get an o¤er with probability s, where D0() > 0 and D00() > 0. Wage o¤ers are drawn
from the same exogenous wage o¤er distribution F (w).6 Any employed worker trivially
chooses to accept the o¤er if the o¤ered wage is above his current wage rate w, which
occurs with probability 1 F (w). At the end of any time period, all job matches face an
exogenous probability  of being hit by a job destruction shock.
For any given worker, the existence of search frictions generates a substantial amount
of wage uctuations over time. This should naturally induce them to accumulate some
precautionary savings. I shall therefore assume that workers can buy any amount of a
risk-free asset. However, they cannot borrow.7 The risk-free interest rate is denoted by
r.
Finally, the insurance policy, which is the focus of this paper, raises the income of
unemployed workers by z and reduces the income of workers employed at wage w by T (w)
(where T (w) can be negative for some w). Thus, z determines the provision of insurance
against unemployment and T () that of insurance against wage uctuations.
Let U(A) and W (A;w) denote the expected utility of an unemployed worker with
wealth A and of an employed worker with wage w and wealth A, respectively. The
structure of the model implies that U(A) can be written recursively as:
U(A) = max
fcu;su;Rg
v(cu) Du(su)+ 1
1 + 

su
Z w
R
W (A0; x)dF (x) + (1  su [1  F (R)])U(A0)

(1)
subject to:
A0 = (1 + r)A+ b+ z   cu and A0  0, (2)
where A0 denotes next periods value of A. Similarly, W (A;w) satises:
W (A;w) = max
fc;sg
v(c) D(s) (3)
+
1
1 + 

s
Z w
w
W (A0; x)dF (x) + U(A0) + (1     s [1  F (w)])W (A0; w)

subject to:
A0 = (1 + r)A+ w   T (w)  c and A0  0. (4)
The solution to these optimization problems is characterized by the following policy
6The assumption of an exogenous wage o¤er distribution rules out any general equilibrium e¤ect of the
policy on the recruiting behavior of rms. There is however no simple and realistic way of endogenizing
this distribution. Moreover, general equilibrium e¤ects are not relevant if, initially, the insurance policy
is only o¤ered to a small fraction of low skilled workers.
7Alternatively, I could impose the natural borrowing limit. However, it is not clear that, in practice,
unemployed workers could be forced to use their unemployment benets to repay their debts.
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functions: cu(A), su(A), R(A), c(A;w), s(A;w).
An unemployed worker with wealth A chooses to set his job acceptance threshold
R(A) such that W (A0; R(A)) = U(A0) where A0 = (1 + r)A + b + z   cu(A). Note that,
if employed and unemployed workers face the same search costs, i.e. D() = Du(), then
R(A) is determined by R(A)   T (R(A)) = b + z, which implies that the job acceptance
threshold is independent of wealth, i.e. R(A) = R. Indeed, if D() = Du(), then there
is no option value (neither positive nor negative) of remaining unemployed. In that case,
jobless workers are willing to accept an o¤er w provided that this raises their income, i.e.
provided that w   T (w)  b+ z.
Let g(A;w) denote the joint p.d.f. of wealth and wages among employed workers in
steady state. The support of this distribution is [0; A] [R; w], where R is the lowest job
acceptance threshold among the unemployed. It follows that the actual wage distribution
is given by gw(w) =
R A
0
g(A;w)dA. Similarly, gu(A) denotes the wealth distribution
among unemployed workers. Its support is [0; A]. In steady state, the ow into the
set of unemployed workers must be equal to the corresponding outow. The rate u of
unemployment must therefore satisfy: Z A
0
su(A) [1  F (R(A))] gu(A)dA
!
u = (1  u). (5)
Throughout my analysis, I impose that the insurance policy fz; T ()g operates under
a balanced budget.8 It must therefore satisfy:
uz = (1  u)
Z w
R
T (w)gw(w)dw. (6)
The objective of the planner is to maximize social welfare as measured by:
u
Z A
0
U(A)gu(A)dA+ (1  u)
Z A
0
Z w
R
W (A;w)g(A;w)dwdA. (7)
The optimal policy problem consists in determining z and T () such as to maximize social
welfare (7) subject to the structure of the economy summarized by (1), (2), (3) and (4)
and to the budget constraint (6). As this problem cannot be solved analytically, I rely
on numerical simulations throughout my analysis.
8As explained in the following section, I calibrate F (w) to the distribution of wages net of government
taxes and transfers in order to focus on the desirability of an additional provision of insurance. However,
the insurance policy modies the rate of unemployment and the distribution of wages, which could a¤ect
government revenue. For simplicity and transparency, I am assuming that the provider of insurance,
whether public or private, is not required to make a compensating transfer to the federal government.
While it would be possible to relax this assumption, the magnitude of the transfers implied by the optimal
policy would be very small and probably even negative.
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The structure of my model is very close to that of Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen,
Neumann and Werwatz (2005). There are however three key di¤erences. First, I assume
that workers are risk-averse, second, I do not impose that the cost of searching on the job
is equal to that of searching while unemployed and, nally, I allow for private savings.
Lise (2013) also studies a model of the wage ladder with risk-averse workers and private
savings, but he assumes identical costs of searching on and o¤ the job.
My model does not allow for an intensive margin of labor supply within a job. This is
consistent with substantial empirical evidence showing that workers have a very limited
ability to adjust their hours of work within a job.9 However, an increase in the distribution
of o¤ered wages induces low wage workers to raise their search intensity which eventually
results in higher paying jobs. Moreover, the search intensity s could also capture the
e¤ort that a worker is willing to make on the job in the hope of getting promoted. Thus,
my model does not prevent gross earnings from responding to changes in tax rates. It is
therefore consistent with the observation of a positive intensive margin elasticity at the
macro level.
Now that the theoretical model is fully specied, I turn to its calibration.
3 Calibration
I calibrate the model such that a time period corresponds to one month. Workers discount
the future at 4% per year, i.e.  = 0:04=12. They have a CRRA utility function:
v(c) =
c1    1
1   , (8)
where the coe¢ cient  of relative risk aversion is equal to 2. I assume that the real risk-
free interest rate is equal to 1% per year, i.e. r = 0:01=12. In the benchmark calibration,
this implies an average wealth to yearly GDP ratio equal to 1.32. While not very large,
this number seems to be of a plausible magnitude for low skilled workers who are typically
not very wealthy.
I then need to calibrate the exogenous wage o¤er distribution f(w). My theoretical
framework implies that the wage o¤er distribution corresponds to the wage distribution
among newly employed workers, provided that the unemployeds reservation thresholds
R(A) are su¢ ciently low. To uncover this distribution I rely on PSID data from 1997 to
2007. I focus on the heads of households and exclude workers younger than 25 or older
than 60 years old, the self-employed and those who have been out of the labor force in
the previous year. As I want to focus throughout this paper on the provision of insurance
9See, for instance, Altonji and Paxson (1992), Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Stewart and Swa¢ eld
(1997) or Chetty, Friedman, Olsen and Pistaferri (2011).
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to low skilled workers, I restrict my sample to those who have never been to college.10
I can then easily obtain the monthly gross-income distribution among those who where
unemployed in the previous year.
Note that the progressivity of the tax code already o¤ers some insurance against wage
uctuations. In this paper, I want to investigate the welfare consequences of providing
additional (educational-level specic) insurance against wage uctuations. Hence, f(w)
must correspond to the distribution of net-income among newly employed workers. I
therefore rely on the NBER microsimulation device TAXSIM in order to obtain the net
monthly salary for all the 577 workers of my sample. To compute the workers tax
liability with TAXSIM, I assume for simplicity that they do not receive any income other
than their salary and that they are all single.11 The corresponding empirical wage o¤er
distribution is plotted in Figure 1. Rather than calibrate my model with the somewhat
noisy empirical wage o¤er distribution, I use the smooth lognormal distribution of Figure
1. The lower bound of this distribution is $600, its mean is $1614 and its standard
deviation is $646.12
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
x 10 -3
Net monthly salary in US dollars
Figure 1: Wage O¤er Distribution
A possible concern with the proposed calibration strategy is that it fails to account
10Note that, in the context of redistribution, it is not desirable to condition taxes on the level of
education as this would induce agents to under-invest in human capital accumulation. By contrast,
I focus here on a pure social insurance problem. Hence, conditioning the provision of insurance on
education, or on any other proxy for the wage o¤er distribution facing the individual, has no adverse
behavioral consequences.
11Allowing for marriage, which is an important source of insurance for many individuals, would clearly
reduce the welfare gains generated by the insurance policy under investigation. However, the analysis of
marriage is beyond the scope of my paper which therefore focuses on single individuals.
12In the empirical distribution, only 5 workers out of 577 earn less than $600 per month. The mean
and standard deviations of the empirical distribution are $1590 and $599, respectively.
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for the fact that some low-paying job o¤ers might be rejected by unemployed workers
who have a high reservation threshold R(A). This would induce low wage o¤ers to be
under-represented in Figure 1. In my sample, 63.8% of unemployed workers do not
receive any income from unemployment compensation.13 These workers presumably have
lower reservation thresholds than those who do receive some unemployment benets.
The average compensation among recipients between 2002 and 2006 is $1058. If we
focus on low salaries, i.e. below $1600, we nd that the average earnings of those who
are eligible and of those who are not is approximately the same, it is equal to $1227
and $1210, respectively.14 This suggests that workers who do not receive unemployment
compensation are not more likely to accept low o¤ers and, hence, that the selection bias
underlying the construction of Figure 1 is not too severe. Moreover, the distribution of
wage o¤ers of Figure 1 already includes a high mass of very low o¤ers (with nearly a
third of o¤ers below $1250). As we shall see, the benchmark calibration implies that
unemployed workers accept all job o¤ers.
I calibrate the exogenous monthly job destruction probability  such that the equi-
librium rate of unemployment is equal to 5%. As I subsequently calibrate the search
cost function of the unemployed Du() such that the monthly job nding probability is
equal to 1=3, the steady state condition for unemployment (5) immediately implies that
 = (0:05=3) =(1  0:05) ' 0:0175. It follows that the expected match length for workers
at the top of the wage distribution who are not searching on the job, i.e. the maximal
expected match length in the economy, is equal to 1= = 57 months, i.e. 4 years and 9
months.
Only 36.2% of unemployed workers receive some unemployment compensation. Be-
tween 2002 and 2006, these workers received on average $1058. I therefore set the level
of unemployment benets b to $383. Setting it to $1058 for all workers would fail to
recognize that raising the average generosity of unemployment benets requires raising
taxes to nance them. Hence, it is important to allow for the fact that increasing the
generosity of unemployment benets, by setting z > 0, requires raising some revenue
through T () such to satisfy the budget constraint (6).
Finally, I need to calibrate the search cost functions Du() and D(). I assume that
13This is either due to incomplete take-up (cf. Currie 2004) or to ineligibility. Ineligibility could result
from temporary work, part-time employment, benets exhaustion beyond 26 weeks, insu¢ cient past
employment experience or quits.
14On average, across the whole distribution, eligible workers have a salary of $1750 while ineligible
workers earn $1498. However, this di¤erence is not due to a di¤erent rejection rate of low o¤ers among
those whose reservation threshold is below $1600. As $1600 seems to be a high threshold for this popu-
lation, this suggests that the di¤erence in average earnings is primarily due to di¤erent characteristics of
workers across the two groups which leads to di¤erent distribution of o¤ers being received above $1600.
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they are both given by a power function:
Du(su) = ku
s
u
u
u
and D(s) = k
s

. (9)
I calibrate ku such that the monthly job nding probability is equal to 1=3. The curvature
parameter u is set such that the elasticity of the unemployment duration with respect to
the generosity of unemployment benets b is equal to 0.5, consistently with the empirical
evidence surveyed by Krueger and Meyer (2002).
The main impediment to the provision of insurance against wage uctuations is that
it reduces on-the-job search and, hence, the reallocation of workers to better paying jobs.
The calibration of the cost of on-the-job search is therefore critical to my numerical
exercise. For this, I rely on empirical evidence provided by Gentry and Hubbard (2004).
Relying on PSID data from 1979 to 1993, they estimated that workers face a 0.0987
annual probability of moving to better jobs.15 I therefore calibrate k such that the
monthly transition probability is equal to 1  (1  0:0987) 112 ' 0:0086. This implies that
the job-to-job transition ow is 49% as large as the job destruction ow (since  = 0:0175).
Finally, to calibrate , I use the fact that, according to Gentry and Hubbard (2004), a
5% increase in the marginal tax rate decreases the probability of job turnover by 0.0079,
i.e. by 8%. Note that, assuming that workers face a marginal tax rate of16 37%, a 5%
increase in their marginal tax rate is equivalent to a 7.94% marginal tax on their net
earnings (since 1   0:37   0:05 = (1   0:37)(1   0:0794)). I therefore calibrate  such
that imposing a 7.94% tax rate on net earnings (while rebating the proceeds lump sum
to all the workers such as to avoid, on average, creating an income e¤ect) decreases the
monthly probability of turnover to 1  (1  (0:0987  0:0079)) 112 ' 0:0079.
To perform this calibration and to subsequently investigate the insurance policy, I rely
on numerical simulations of the model. I implement the Howard improvement algorithm
to characterize the value functions, the policy functions and the corresponding distribu-
tion of wealth and wages. I assume a discrete wage o¤er distribution with support {$650,
$750, $850,..., $4950}. The wage ladder therefore contains 44 rungs. I discretize the
wealth distribution into 41 grid points between $0 and $300 000 and allow for 600 inter-
polations between any two grid points. This implies that, for any agent, the smallest unit
of savings is equal (30000=40)=600 = $12:5. The dimension of the state is 41  45 = 1845
(since there are 41 wealth states and 45 labor market states corresponding to the 44 wage
rungs and to unemployment). The Howard improvement algorithm cannot handle a much
15These moves could correspond to promotions and do not necessarily involve a change in employer.
However, in my model, the search intensity of employed job seekers could be interpreted as including the
e¤ort that workers make in the hope of getting promoted.
16In my PSID sample, 37% is the average marginal tax rate faced by all the workers (including those
who were not unemployed in the previous year).
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larger dimension of the state since it requires inverting a transition matrix of dimension
1845 1845. However, the steady state wealth and wage distributions g(A;w) and gu(A)
can be directly obtained from this transition matrix, which yields almost perfect accuracy.
The parameters generated by the calibration are summarized in Table 1.17
Parameter Value Target
 0.04/12 
r 0.01/12 Wealth to yearly output ratio equal to 1.32
 2 
 0.0175 5% unemployment rate
f() Lognormal PSID data
b $ 383 PSID data
ku 0.0097 Monthly job nding probability equal to 1/3
u 1.0855 Elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benets equal to 0.5
k 0.0067 Monthly job-to-job transition probability equal to 0.0086
 1.1245 Elasticity of turnover with respect to marginal tax rate from Gentry Hubbard 2004
Table 1: Parameter Values
The calibration implies that the search cost functions are close to being linear.18 More-
over, searching for a job is always less costly while employed than while unemployed. Even
though the job-to-job transition ow is only half as large as the job destruction ow, the
cost of on-the-job search needs to be very low in order to induce workers who already
have a job to search for a better one. As employment decreases the cost of searching
for a job, unemployed workers are willing to accept all the o¤ers that they receive. This
implies that, at least in theory, the wage o¤er distribution f() and the wage distribution
among newly employed workers, which was used to produce Figure 1, are identical.
4 Simulation
Before investigating the insurance policy, I briey review the main features of the steady
state equilibrium of the model. Figure 2 displays the simulated wage distribution (the
17An alternative strategy would have been to rely on a structural estimation of the model. However,
to the extent that the model is a simplied representation of reality, rather than forcing the model to t
some micro-data, it seems more sensible to calibrate the model to ensure that the behavioral elasticities
are of a plausible magnitude.
18Note that Lise (2013), who performed a structural estimation of a similar model with a single cost
function for both employed and unemployed workers, found a similar degree of curvature of the search
cost function (he found a curvature parameter of 1.168 among low skilled workers).
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thick line), the o¤er distribution (the dotted line) together with the empirical wage distri-
bution across all employed low skilled worker in the aforementioned PSID data set from
1997 to 2007. In the simulation, the average wage is equal to $1935 and the corresponding
standard deviation is $600. In the data, the mean is $2034 and the standard deviation
is $779. Given the stylized nature of the model (which was not calibrated to match the
wage distribution), the simulation provides a reasonable t to the data and manages
to explain the bulk of wage dispersion observed in the PSID sample. Importantly, the
model predicts that, on average, workers who lose their job will su¤er from a wage cut of
(1935  1614)=1935 = 16:6% upon re-employment.19
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Figure 2: Wage Distribution
The average wealth of an agent amounts to $29 191. The standard deviation of the
wealth distribution is $34 952. Also, less than 6.6% of the population holds no wealth.
Interestingly, the average wealth of an unemployed worker is equal to $49 847 while
that of an employed worker is $28 104. To understand this phenomenon, recall that all
workers are equally likely to become unemployed in any given month. Thus, the average
wealth of newly unemployed workers is $28 104. However, once unemployed, the search
intensity of wealth-rich individuals is much lower than that of wealth-poor individuals.
Hence, the duration of unemployment is much larger among the rich than among the
poor. This composition e¤ect explains why, on average, the unemployed are richer than
the employed.
19The empirical distribution of wages and o¤ered wages from the PSID sample suggests an average
wage cut of (2034   1590)=2034 = 21:8% upon re-employment. Of course, the actual empirical average
magnitude of wage loss upon re-employment is di¤erent if the model is not correctly specied, e.g. if all
workers are not all equally likely to lose their job in a given month.
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Figure 3 displays the average search intensity of employed workers for each wage level.
The dot on the left indicates the average search intensity of unemployed workers. Clearly,
workers who earn more than $1500 are hardly searching on the job. This implies that the
moral hazard impact of any additional provision of insurance will be most pronounced at
the bottom of the wage distribution.
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Figure 3: Search intensity
Finally, Figure 4 displays the average consumption level for each wage level. The dot
on the left indicates the average consumption level of the unemployed, who are on average
richer than the rest of the population. The dotted line corresponds to the 45 degree line,
which would give the relationship between the wage rate and consumption in the absence
of savings. This gure reveals that agent manage to considerably reduce uctuations
in consumption by accumulating some precautionary savings. They nevertheless have a
limited ability to smooth high wage shocks. This is explained by the dynamics of the wage
ladder which imply that high wage shocks are very persistent. Indeed, they last until the
workers become unemployed. Perhaps surprisingly, workers with very low salaries have a
higher consumption level than workers earning $1500. This is due to the fact that workers
with bad jobs are searching actively for better opportunities and are therefore expecting
to earn more than $1500 in the future, while workers earning $1500 are likely to remain
at this rung of the wage ladder until they become unemployed.
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Figure 4: Consumption
5 Policy Analysis
Let us now investigate the impact of an enhanced provision of insurance on the equilibrium
of the economy. For most of the analysis, I will set z equal to 0 in order to focus on
the provision of insurance against wage uctuations rather than on insurance against
unemployment. The extent of insurance against wage uctuations is determined by the
shape of the transfer function T () and, more specically, by its degree of progressivity.
Indeed, if T () is linear, i.e. T (w) = w, then the budget constraint (6) imposes that
it must be equal to zero, i.e.  = 0. By contrast, if T () is progressive, i.e. T (w)=w
increasing in w, then, under a balanced budget, the transfer increases the labor income
of low-wage employees, i.e. w   T (w) > w for a low w, and decreases the labor income
of high-wage employees, i.e. w   T (w) < w for a high w.
In this section, I rst conduct a positive analysis of the e¤ect of progressivity on
the equilibrium of the economy. This highlights the main trade-o¤s generated by the
provision of insurance against wage uctuations. In a second subsection, I numerically
solve for the optimal non-linear insurance schedule T ().
5.1 Impact of Progressivity
To investigate the economic e¤ects of progressivity, I focus on the following family of
transfer functions which has recently been used by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante
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(2012) and Karabarbounis (2012):
T (w) = w   w1  . (10)
The labor income of a worker employed at wage w is therefore equal to w T (w) = w1  .
This functional form is convenient for my analysis as a single parameter,  , captures the
degree of progressivity of the insurance policy. The other parameter, , is set such as to
balance the budget constraint (6). Note that the size of the transfer is always equal to
zero at the wage rate ~w = 1= . The insurance policy therefore generates a transfer from
workers with w > ~w to those with w < ~w.
When  = 0, there is no provision of insurance, i.e.  = 1 and T (w) = 0, and we are
back to the benchmark case of the previous section. When  = 1, there is full provision
of insurance as workersnet income is independent of their wage rates, i.e. w T (w) = .
Hence, there is no incentives to search on the job which implies that the distributions of
actual and o¤ered wages coincide. The income of all workers is therefore equal to the
mean of the distribution of wage o¤ers, i.e.  = $1603.20
I now simulate the model for intermediate values of  . Figure 5 displays the distribu-
tions of wages, i.e. of w, and of labor incomes, i.e. of w  T (w), for  equal to 0, 0.5 and
to 1. When  = 0, the wage and income distributions coincide and are given by the thin
dashed line. When  = 0:5, the wage distribution is given by the bold dashed line while
the labor income distribution is given by the bold solid line. Clearly, the progressivity of
the insurance policy reduces the dispersion of labor incomes. However, raising  from 0
to 0.5 reduces incentives to search on the job which results in a downward shift of the
wage distribution. Finally, when  = 1, there is no on-the-job search. Hence, the wage
distribution coincides with the o¤er distribution, given by the thin dotted line, while the
income distribution is a mass point at $1603, represented by a thin solid vertical line.
20For the numerical simulations, I rely on a discrete wage o¤er distribution which has a mean, $1603,
which is slightly below the mean, $1614, of the corresponding continuous distribution mentioned in the
calibration section.
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Figure 5: Wage and Labor Income Distributions
Table 2 displays summary statistics of the equilibrium of the economy for di¤erent
values of  . As already mentioned, by enhancing the provision of insurance, progressivity
reduces incentives to search on the job which translates into a lower search intensity for
employed workers. However, from the perspective of an unemployed worker, progressiv-
ity reduces the dispersion of o¤ered wages which increases the attractiveness of being
employed rather than unemployed. Moreover, as actual wages are higher than o¤ered
wages, progressivity slightly increases the mean of o¤ered wages. Hence, as the degree
of progressivity increases, the search intensity of unemployed workers rises which reduces
the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Search intensity employed (%) 1.298 1.134 0.970 0.802 0.632 0.461 0.293 0.137 0.026 0.0002 0.0000
Search intensity unemployed (%) 33.3 36.4 40.2 44.3 48.6 53.6 59.1 65.4 72.0 78.0 81.0
Unemployment (%) 5.00 4.58 4.18 3.81 3.48 3.17 2.88 2.61 2.38 2.20 2.12
Output ($) 1838 1818 1794 1766 1734 1697 1656 1612 1575 1568 1569
Wealth ($) 29191 25702 22356 19228 16411 13857 11669 9783 8285 7267 6834
Welfare gain (%) 0 0.024 -0.140 -0.535 -1.203 -2.222 -3.647 -5.466 -7.195 -7.653 -7.634
Table 2: Impact of Progressivity on Equilibrium
By reducing on-the-job search, progressivity discourages workers from moving from
low to high productivity jobs. This makes the labor market more sclerotic which reduces
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the output level.21 The reduction in unemployment induced by progressivity is far too
small to o¤set this e¤ect (except as  increases from 0.9 to 1).
In their analysis of the Swedish labor market, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) were
among the rst to emphasize that progressivity reduces the rate of unemployment at the
cost of a more sclerotic labor market. While the same conclusion holds in the current
context, the underlying mechanism is somewhat di¤erent. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995)
do not allow for on-the-job search, but assume that wages are exposed to random shocks.
Hence, in their model, progressivity reduces the reservation wage of unemployed workers,
which induces them to accept a larger faction of job o¤ers, and it reduces the reservation
wage of employed workers, which increases the likelihood that they choose to retain their
job in case it is hit by an adverse productivity shock. Both e¤ects concur to reduce the
average match productivity, which results in a lower level of GDP.
By contrast, in my model, the reservation wage is always equal to the lower bound
of the wage o¤er distribution, i.e. all o¤ers are always accepted. This results from my
calibration where searching for a job is cheaper while employed than unemployed. In my
model, progressivity reduces unemployment because workers are risk-averse and value
job o¤ers more highly if their dispersion is reduced. This mechanism is absent from
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) who assume that workers are risk-neutral. Also, I obtain
that progressivity reduces output because it discourages workers from climbing the wage
ladder, not because workers fail to quit following an adverse productivity shock.
Progressivity reduces the average wealth of individuals. This is hardly surprising as
an increase in the provision of insurance against labor income uctuations reduces the
demand for precautionary savings. When  = 1, the remaining wealth is used as self-
insurance against the unemployment risk. The fact that the level of wealth when  = 1
is less than a quarter of that level when  = 0 shows that wage uctuations, rather than
unemployment, is the main source of demand for precautionary savings.
If the interest rate was endogenous, then progressivity would reduce the capital stock
which would raise the interest rate. In practice, it is however unlikely that the precau-
tionary savings behavior of low skilled workers has any signicant inuence on the capital
stock of the economy and on the interest rate. Hence, a serious attempt to endogenize
the interest rate in a closed economy would require allowing for high skilled workers, for
life-cycle savings and, potentially, for bequests.22
Finally, Table 2 shows that enhancing the provision of insurance against wage uc-
tuations hardly increases the welfare of workers. Indeed, setting  = 0:1 is equivalent to
raising the consumption of all workers in all states of the world in the benchmark alloca-
21As the population has been normalized to 1, output corresponds to both total GDP and average
GDP per capita.
22Even though they do not focus on low skilled workers, Conesa and Krueger (2006) nd the general
equilibrium e¤ects to be rather unimportant for the determination of the optimal policy.
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tion with  = 0 by a mere 0:024%. Further increases in the degree of progressivity of the
insurance policy can generate large welfare losses. Thus, with private savings, the adverse
moral hazard e¤ect of progressivity on on-the-job search dominates the welfare-enhancing
reduction in the variance of labor incomes.
5.2 Optimal Insurance Policy
Let us now characterize the optimal insurance policy. Within the above class of transfer
functions, the optimal degree of progressivity is characterized by  = 0:06 which generates
a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of only 0:040%. However, this result about the
undesirability of insurance is potentially misleading to the extent that the functional form
under consideration imposes the same degree of progressivity at the bottom and at the
top of the wage distribution. This is unlikely to be optimal since the intensity of the
trade-o¤ between insurance and incentives is not constant along the wage distribution.
Indeed, Figure 3 suggests that moral hazard on the job can be a big concern below $1500,
but not above.
Fortunately, it tuns out to be possible to characterize numerically the optimal non-
linear transfer function. As shown by Figure 3, the moral hazard e¤ect is virtually
inexistent towards the top of the wage distribution. It is therefore trivially desirable
to provide full insurance against wage uctuations above a certain threshold. Hence,
to determine the optimal schedule T (), I solve for the welfare maximizing transfer level
T (w) at each rung w of the wage ladder while adjusting the constant consumption level at
the top, and the corresponding transfer levels, such as to balance the budget constraint
(6). I then iterate across all the ladders (below the full insurance threshold) until no
adjustment in any of the transfer levels can increase welfare.23
The optimal insurance policy is shown in Figure 6 which represents the monthly labor
income w   T (w) of a worker as a function of his net monthly salary w. The extent of
insurance against wage uctuations is far from constant across the wage distribution.
Hardly any transfers are made below $1450. In fact, the transfers are even negative
between $1250 and $1450! As the wage of a worker increases from $1450 to $1550, his
labor income increases from $1413 to $2000. This makes the optimal transfer schedule
regressive towards the lower half of the wage distribution.24 Finally, there is almost full
provision of insurance above $1550, with all workers employed at $1750 or more earning
a monthly labor income of $2104.
23By applying this procedure, I obtain a local maximum of the welfare function. To check that this
is also a global maximum, I have performed a grid search on a piecewise linear approximation to the
optimal schedule.
24Thus, here in the context of random search on and o¤ the job, as in Golosov, Maziero and Menzio
(2012) in the context of directed search o¤ the job, some regressivity is desirable in order to enhance
workersincentives to search for high productivity jobs.
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Figure 6: Optimal Insurance Policy
It is not desirable to increase the labor income of workers earning less than $1450
as this would reduce their incentives to search on the job. Instead, they should rely on
private savings together with the prospect of moving to a better paying job in order to
self-insure against low wage realizations. By contrast, even without any transfers, workers
employed at $1550 or more hardly search on the job. Indeed, workers employed at $1750,
$2500 or $4000 will keep earning the same wage until they become unemployed. They
should therefore be provided perfect insurance by all earning a labor income of $2104.25
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the economy with no insurance and with the
optimal insurance schedule of Figure 6. The surprising result is that, no only does the
insurance policy manages to maintain incentives to search on the job, it in fact increases
them! Indeed, by implementing the optimal schedule, the average monthly probability
that an employed worker moves to a better job increases from 1.30 to 1.43%. This is
mainly due to the fact that, by eliminating the dispersion of labor income at the top of
the wage o¤er distribution, the insurance policy increases the incentives to search on the
job. Consequently, the fraction of employed workers earning $1450 or less drops from
20.7 to 15.8% (while the wage o¤er distribution implies that 53.7% of o¤ered wages are
equal to $1450 or less). Figure 7 displays the wage distribution with and without the
implementation of the optimal policy.
25The implementation of a very high degree of insurance requires that workers and rms cannot collude
by manipulating the monthly salary at the expense of the insurance company. Endogenizing the extent
of these collusions is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 7: Wage Distribution With and Without Optimal Insurance
By reducing the dispersion of labor incomes among employed workers, the insurance
policy makes employment more attractive. This leads to a signicant increase in the
search intensity of unemployed workers which results in a lower rate of unemployment.
A larger number of employed workers together with higher distribution of wages among
the employed raises the output level by 2.39%. The average wealth level falls by 38.6%.
This is primarily due to the disappearance of the right tail of the wealth distribution.
Indeed, the insurance policy eliminates the very high labor incomes which, in the absence
of insurance, is a major source of precautionary savings.
No insurance benchmark Optimal insurance schedule
Search intensity employed (%) 1.298 1.432
Search intensity unemployed (%) 33.3 40.7
Unemployment (%) 5.00 4.13
Output ($) 1838 1882
Wealth ($) 29191 17923
Standard deviation of labor income ($) 600 293
Standard deviation of consumption ($) 324 197
Welfare gain (%) 0 1.326
Table 3: Equilibrium With and Without Insurance
Not only does the transfer function increases incentives to search on the job and while
unemployed, it also does provide a substantial amount of insurance against wage shocks.
22
Indeed, the insurance policy more than halves the standard deviation of labor incomes.26
It induces a slightly smaller decline, of 39.2%, in the standard deviation of consumption.
The smaller reduction in the variability of consumption is due to the reduction in the
accumulation of precautionary savings which hinders the extent to which workers can
self-insure against low wage realizations.
While, at the optimum, there is a trade-o¤ between the provision of insurance and
the maximization of output, it turns out that, starting from a no insurance benchmark,
it is possible to increase both insurance and output. It is therefore not surprising that
the implementation of the optimal policy generates a sizeable consumption-equivalent
welfare gain of 1.326%.
Finally, note that increasing z such as to enhance the provision b+z of unemployment
insurance, while re-optimizing T (), reduces the welfare of workers. The magnitude of the
moral hazard e¤ect of unemployment insurance, together with the short average duration
of unemployment spells, make it preferable that workers primarily rely on precautionary
savings in order to maintain a high consumption level while out of work.
6 No Savings
While we have assumed that workers choose to accumulate some savings in order to self-
insure against stochastic shocks to their labor incomes, the fact is that many households,
especially among the low-skilled, do not hold any wealth. Using the U.S. Survey of
Consumer Finances from 1995, Wol¤ (1998) reports a mean net worth of the lowest two
quintiles of the wealth distribution of only $900. Relying on the Survey of Income and
Program Participation panels spanning 1985 to 2000, Chetty (2008) nds that, before
unemployment, the median liquid wealth net of unsecured debt of a worker is equal
to a mere $128. He then argues that this provides a major justication for a fairly
generous provision of unemployment insurance. Similarly, the apparent inability of many
households to self-insure by accumulating some precautionary savings could signicantly
a¤ect the optimal design of insurance against wage uctuations. In this section, I therefore
characterize the optimal policy in the absence of private savings.
The model without savings is calibrated following the same procedure as above. The
parameters of the cost functions become ku = 0:0567, u = 2:7212, k = 0:0095 and
 = 1:2302. This calibration implies that unemployed workers accept all the o¤ers that
they receive, consistently with the identication strategy for the wage o¤er distribution
(summarized by Figure 1).
The calibrated model generates a wage distribution with mean $1935 and standard
2699.2% of this reduction is due to the transfer function. The remaining 0.8% is due to the slight
decrease in the dispersion of the wage distribution which could be seen in Figure 7.
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deviation $603 which is almost identical to that displayed in Figure 2. The key summary
statistics of the model without savings are displayed below in the middle column of Table
4. They are almost identical to the corresponding statistics for the economy with savings.
Considering the one parameter family of transfer functions from the previous section,
(10), the e¤ect of progressivity on the equilibrium of the economy is very similar to those
reported in Table 2 with two important exceptions. First, progressivity hardly has any
impact on the search intensity of unemployed workers and, hence, on the equilibrium rate
of unemployment. This results from the calibration of the model without savings which
imposes a very high cost of searching intensively for a job while unemployed. This feature
is necessary to match a monthly job nding probability of only 1/3 despite the low level of
unemployment benets. The second di¤erence is that welfare is maximized for  = 0:42, a
fairly high degree of progressivity, and the corresponding consumption-equivalent welfare
gain amounts to 2.59%. Imposing a high degree of progressivity is much more desirable
without savings than with, even though the adverse e¤ect on on-the-job search is equally
large in both cases. Indeed, in the absence of savings, the provision of insurance is the
only way to raise the consumption level of low wage workers.
Proceeding as in the previous section, I have characterized numerically the optimal
insurance policy which is displayed in Figure 8. While the shape of the optimal transfer
function is similar to the one obtained with savings, the magnitude of the transfers at
low income levels is much larger. A worker employed at wage $650 receives a transfer
of $480 which allows his labor income to reach $1130. This more generous provision of
insurance is paid for by a lower income level at the upper end of the distribution. Workers
employed at $1450 or more receive a labor income of $1963.
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Figure 8: Optimal Insurance Policy in the Absence of Savings
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As reported in Table 4, the optimal insurance policy reduces incentives to search
on the job. This leads to a 3.75% drop in output. The standard deviation of labor
income, and hence of consumption, drops by 62.0%. Clearly, the absence of savings tilts
the design of the optimal policy towards a more generous provision of insurance at the
expense of incentives to search on the job. Implementing this optimal policy generates a
large consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 4.383%.
No insurance benchmark Optimal insurance schedule
Search intensity employed (%) 1.314 0.929
Search intensity unemployed (%) 33.3 33.5
Unemployment (%) 5.00 4.97
Output ($) 1838 1769
Standard deviation of labor income ($) 603 229
Welfare gain (%) 0 4.383
Table 4: Equilibrium of the No Savings Economy With and Without Insurance
In the absence of insurance, increasing the generosity of unemployment insurance
generates large welfare gains. The optimal policy is to set z equal to $848, which raises
b + z to $1231, together with full insurance above $1450 and no insurance below that
level. Thus, $1450 becomes the reservation wage and all workers earn $1800. There is
no on-the-job search. The unemployment rate rises to 18.4% while output falls to $1625
(a 11.59% drop compared to the no insurance benchmark). This fully optimal policy
nevertheless generates a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 28.058%.
7 Conclusion
This paper has relied on a model of the wage ladder to investigate the provision of
insurance against search-induced wage dispersion. My rst result was that implementing
a generous provision of insurance makes work more attractive for the unemployed and,
hence, decreases the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
I have then characterized the optimal insurance policy. The key trade-o¤ at work is
that an overly generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to move up the wage
ladder, which results in workers remaining stuck in low productivity jobs. This explains
why the optimal policy is to provide virtually no insurance towards the lower half of
the wage distribution, i.e. to the low wage workers who would value it the most. They
should instead rely on their private savings to sustain a decent consumption level while
seeking to improve their labor income by moving to better quality jobs. By contrast, full
insurance should be provided over the upper half of the wage distribution. These workers
25
are su¢ ciently high in the wage ladder that they would not be searching for better jobs
anyway. Hence, it is desirable to eliminate the risk that determines their exact position
in the upper half of the wage ladder.
A surprising result is that, not only does the optimal insurance policy reduce the risk
to which workers are exposed, it also increases the production e¢ ciency of the economy.
Indeed, in my main calibration, the implementation of the optimal policy reduces the rate
of unemployment and enhances the search intensity of employed workers. This induces
aggregate output to rise by more than 2%. The optimal policy generates a substantial
welfare gain which slightly exceeds 1.3% of consumption.
In the absence of private savings, it becomes desirable to provide more insurance to low
wage workers, to an extent that reduces output. Low wage workers should nevertheless
still be provided with incentives to search on the job, which explains why their labor
incomes remain signicantly lower than those of high wage workers.
In this paper, I have exclusively focused on simple history-independent policies. Fu-
ture work is necessary to determine whether signicant additional welfare gains can be
obtained by allowing for history-dependence. If the literature on unemployment insurance
is any guide27, then the answer is likely to depend heavily on whether or not individuals
can accumulate some precautionary savings.
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